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Governance Puzzles 
 
John Clarke 
 
Chapter for Leslie Budd and Lisa Harris: eGovernance: Managing or Governing? 
Routledge. 
 
 
This chapter focuses primarily on puzzles about changing forms and practices of 
governance and then addresses the ways in which issues of egovernance are implicated 
in these puzzles. Governance has emerged as a key concern of studies of changing 
relations between state and society or government and people in the last two decades 
(see, inter alia, Cooper, 1998; Kooiman, 1993; Newman, 2001 and 2005; Pierre, 2000; 
Rhodes, 1997). Despite – or possibly even because of – this growing attention, it 
remains a somewhat blurred and elusive term, bearing a range of different meanings 
and interpretations, and carrying the imprint of different theoretical perspectives. 
Neverthelesas, most positions seem to treat governance as a defining feature of the 
modern/contemporary world – for example, expressed in the claim that we have moved 
‘from government to governance’ (Rhodes, 1997). For others, however, governance 
refers to a still emergent set of institutional forms, arrangements and practices involved 
in the coordination of the public realm and its unsettled and uncertain relations with 
other domains – the private, the domestic and the transnational (Newman, 2005). An 
alternative view of governance challenges the ‘grand narrative’ of the shift from 
government to governance and addresses new governance processes as disorganised 
and disorganising (Bode, 2006; Clarke, 2006). 
 
In this chapter, I draw on a diverse field of work about governance that ranges from 
studies of British public service reform to the processes and politics of governing a new 
social, political and economic space – South Eastern Europe. One end of this range – 
British public service reform – appears as a ‘classic case’ of governance studies: the 
move away from direct government to first ‘markets’, and then ‘networks’ as modes of 
governing the public realm (Rhodes, 1997). While it might be marked by new 
dimensions of ‘multi-level governance’ (with levels ranging from the supra-national 
agencies such as the European Union and the World Trade Organization to sub-national 
levels of regional and local governance), it is still framed by a spatial conception of a 
‘mature democracy’, adapting to new governing dynamics. In the process, Britain 
represents a leading example of new models that may be exported to others (from the 
New Public Management to Public Private Partnerships). 
 
In contrast, the other end of this range – the governance of an emergent regional space 
– looks more unsettled. There are problems of defining, much less governing, South 
Eastern Europe (Syrri and Stubbs, 2005). Political and institutional arrangements have 
been profoundly unsettled, and national spaces and their institutionalizations and 
interrelationships are still in process of being worked out. Here, governance and the 
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subjects and objects of governing are in process of simultaneous and mutual invention 
or constitution (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2006). However, I will suggest that studies of 
governance might learn more from such emergent processes than from a focus of 
‘leading examples’. Indeed, the processes of governance emerging in ‘marginal’ 
locations might illuminate what is going on in British governance arrangements. This 
orientation focuses my attention on ‘governance puzzles’ – the peculiar and 
unpredictable dynamics associated with emergent governance arrangements.
1
 
 
The chapter explores two particular ‘puzzles’: the multi-ness of governance; and the 
problem of making governance popular. Both of these puzzles are linked to issues about 
the emergent dynamics of governance and each of them is tied to the rise of 
egovernance in distinctive ways.  
 
The Multi-ness of Governance. 
 
In political science, it has become commonplace to refer to the rise of ‘multi-level 
governance’, indicating the multiplicity of levels, scales, or tiers of governance bodies or 
processes that may be nested together (e.g., Bache and Flinders, 2004). Such levels or 
tiers involve differentiated but overlapping (and possibly even integrated) authority 
over, and claims on, particular governance issues and governable places. Multi-level 
governance is associated with what Rhodes (1997) called the ‘hollowing out of the state’ 
as nation states are subjected to the authority of superordinate tiers and to processes of 
devolution or decentralization to sub-national levels. Processes of both globalization 
and Europeanization have proved fertile terrain for the investigation and elaboration of 
such concepts (see, inter alia, Beyeler, 2003; Ferrera, 2005). There are problems about 
the concept of level, and about the assumption that it has a corresponding spatial 
character (see, for example, Allen, 2003). So we are invited to think of levels nested 
within increasingly larger spaces (from the neighbourhood to the global level). 
Contemporary approaches in geography suggest that space is not ordered in such tidy 
and orderly formations (Massey, 2004). We might want to think about the ways in which 
the ‘multi-ness’ of governance brings new spaces into being, or makes new framings of 
space visible. We may see this in governance projects that aim to bring new regions 
such as ‘South East Europe’ into being; that construct neighbourhoods as a site of 
governing or new governance arrangements for primary health care that claim to 
address and develop the ‘local health economy’  (Aldred, 2007; Cochrane, 2006; Lendvai 
and Stubbs, 2006).  In the last case, the ‘local’ is not a fixed or given category: indeed, 
the localness of different public services and their governance arrangements may vary 
                                                 
1
  This chapter could not have been written without the work 
of, and conversations with, Rachel Aldred, Stephen Ball, 
Lavinia Bifulco, Vando Borghi, Allan Cochrane, Wendy Larner, 
Noémi Lendvai, Morag McDermont, Nick  Mahony, Jeff 
Maskovsky, Janet Newman, Paul Stubbs and Janine Wedel. I am 
grateful to them all, but they are not responsible for what 
has emerged. 
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substantially, while the ‘health economy’ has to be constructed and developed, rather 
than discovered. Similarly, South East Europe has to be imagined, mapped, and brought 
into being – made into a reality – by the very governance arrangements that name 
themselves as governing the area, just as ‘Europe’ has to be defined and reconstructed 
in the process of its governance through the EU (Walters, 2004). Put simply, the object 
of governannce is constructed in the process of governance – whether this object is a 
space, a group or an institution. And through governance arrangements, claims are 
established about who has the authority to govern, the bases of such authority, and the 
means by which it may be exercised. 
 
This more dynamic understanding of the interrelationship between governance 
processes and spatial formations re-opens the concept of levels (Stubbs, 2002). Where 
multi-level governance treats the organisation of scale and space as vertical, we can 
think about governance relationships as multiple, multi-dimensional and overlaid in 
complicated figures. Some of those relationships are hierarchical and vertical, involving 
claims about forms of sovereignty and authority, and structured around principles of 
decentralization and devolution. But some are horizontal, such as networks within and 
across national borders. For example, Hansen and Salskov-Iversen use the idea of 
‘globalizing webs’ to analyse the transnational articulation of e-government, arguing 
that they ‘can be seen as one organizational instantiation of oh how social processes are 
increasingly unhindered by territorial and jurisdictional barriers and enhance the spread 
of trans-border practices in economic, political and social domains’ (Hansen and 
Salskov-Iversen, 2005: 230). Other governance relationships may work vertically, but 
leap over intervening levels (connecting individuals or localities to supra-national 
agencies) or mix up levels (local partnerships with transnational corporations as one 
partner). In this way, a spatial perspective alerts us to the ways in which ideas, agents 
and practices flow in multiple directions. 
 
In this context I am interested in taking the ‘multi’ of multi-level governance as a pointer 
to the many ‘multi-s’ that might be at stake in these new arrangements of governing. 
For example, governance arrangements that are multi-level are also often multi-
national, multi-agency, and multi-ethnic or multi-cultural. I think these different ‘multi-s’ 
and their intersections form one central governance puzzle: how to analyse governance 
arrangements that are both multiple and mobile. 
 
Governance processes are increasingly engaged by the multi-national – in terms of 
dealing with multiple and overlapping national sovereignties, with cross-border spaces, 
and with transnational processes taking place both between and within particular 
national spaces (flows of objects, money and people for example).  The increasing 
significance of such transnational processes, relations and organisations has given many 
aspects of governance a distinctively multi-national character. This may merely imply 
that governance arrangements link several national spaces in networks, webs or 
partnerships. But multi-national governance may require forms of cross-border working 
or the creation of partnerships that ‘transcend’ national identification – for example, the 
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economic or social development of ‘regions’ that cross borders cannot be allocated to a 
singular national sovereignty claim, Indeed, the region being brought into being may 
acquire its own powers and capacities beyond singular national sovereignty claims (the 
European Union, Mercosur and other ‘economic’ regions embodied in governance 
entities). As a result, governance arrangements both negotiate and modulate the 
sovereignty associated with nations as bounded spaces, even as – in some cases – the 
‘nations’ themselves are in the process of being invented, redefined or recreated. This 
applies equally to the reconfigurations of the countries of the former Yugoslavia as it 
does to the countries of the increasingly dis-united Kingdom (involving differentiated 
forms of ‘national/regional’ devolution).  
 
Governance is, almost by definition, multi-agency: both in the narrow sense of engaging 
multiple agencies in some common project or concern and in the wider sense of 
drawing upon different sorts of agents (individuals, groups, organisations) to engage in 
the business of governing. Governance arrangements, or what Stephen Ball  (2006) has 
called the ‘new architecture of governance’, require multiple agents because specific 
projects or objectives are not the sole property of a single entity (government or a 
government department) but the shared concern of different agents and interests. This 
understanding of the mutli-agentic character of governance links very different 
theoretical perspectives: the governance narrative of UK scholars; the dynamic systems 
view of views of governance as co-steering; and even post-Foucauldian conceptions of 
governing at a distance (Rhodes, 1997; Kooiman, 2000; Rose, 1999). Governance moves 
analytic attention beyond the state – opening up questions of its disaggregation 
(Slaughter, 2004); its decentring (McDonald and Marston, 2006) or its dispersal (Clarke 
and Newman, 1997).  These terms are rather different from some of the epochal claims 
about the disappearance or even death of the state, insisting that the state persists, 
albeit in new formations, relationships and assemblages (Sharma and Gupta, 2006). 
 
‘Partnership’ might be one defining motif of the new governance. Partnership implies 
the displacement of the (nation) state as the sovereign authority, such that governance 
involves co-steering between different types of authority, rather than merely being 
(contingently) devolved authority from the state.  Partnership as a mode of governance 
draws attention to the co-existence of, and possible collaboration between, different 
sources of authority – the public power of the state and varieties of ‘private authority’ 
(corporations, communities, consumers, for example, see Hansen and Salskov-Iversen, 
forthcoming).  In practice, of course, partnerships vary as formations of power and 
authority. Some enrol multiple sources of authority into new projects; others look more 
like virtual partnerships or shells for the pursuit of one set of interests (the recurrent 
criticism levelled at the Private Finance Initiative and its successor form Public Private 
Partnerships in the UK, where ‘corporate welfare’ appears to be the main outcome, e.g., 
Pollock, 2004). Others look like ‘compulsory partnerships’ where the power of the state 
is used to enforce partnership between agents and agencies who might not otherwise 
have sought collaboration (see Glendinning, Powell and Rummery, 2002, on New 
Labour’s approach to partnership making in the UK).  
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This compulsory/coercive approach to partnership as a mode of governance makes 
visible what Jessop (and others) have called the relationship between governance and 
‘meta-governance’. For Jessop ‘meta-governance’ is one of the ways in which the state 
may have been displaced, engaging in new roles and relationships – rather than 
disappearing. Within the complex of new governance mechanisms, the state ‘reserves 
to itself the right to open, close, juggle and re-articulate governance arrangements, not 
only terms of particular functions, but also from the viewpoint of partisan and overall 
political advantage’ (Jessop 2000, p.19). 
 
There are two other dynamics about the multi-agency character of governance that are 
worth some attention. First, new governance arrangements may have to discover, or 
even create, the agents that they need to do the business of governing. For example, 
finding governors, trustees or representatives for particular interests (parents in 
education governance; tenants in social housing governance) is a task of governance. 
Such people have to be discovered, groomed and developed to take up their 
governance roles. They have to possess or acquire the relevant ‘expertise’ to govern, In 
a similar way, governance arrangements often need the objects of governance to be 
‘represented’ (embodied in persons who can ‘speak for them’). Neighbourhoods, 
communities, service users, regions, or specified socio-demographic groups have to be 
‘brought to voice’ in governance. In the following section, I will explore some of the 
complications associated with these processes of representation.  
 
Secondly, however, new governance bodies become agents themselves, acquiring 
powers, capacities and interests unique to them. However limited, transitory or even 
virtual such bodies are – they are nevertheless bodies. They have the capacity to enact 
governance – to make the principles, models and schemas of governance materialise in 
practice. We cannot, or should not assume, that there are direct transitions from the 
principles and plans to the practices of governance. What are conventionally described 
as ‘implementation processes’ are better understood as processes of translation, in 
which meanings are subject to inflection, interpretation by active agents in specific 
locations (Newman, 2006; Lendvai, 2005; Lendvai and Stubbs, 2006, see also 
Czarniawska and Sevón, 2005).  While translation may be true of ‘implementation’ in 
general, it has a particular resonance in relation to governance – because governance 
arrangements are still emergent organizational forms for which previous organizational 
templates may be a poor guide. Terms such as hybrids, flex organizations, public-private 
agencies, network governance and even ‘partnership’ mark out this unstable and 
unpredictable character of governance arrangements (see, for example, Wedel, 2005). 
Hansen and Salskov-Iversen draw out these distinctive properties of emergent forms in 
their discussion of ‘globalising webs’: 
 
Globalising webs challenge conventional distinctions between the inside and 
outside of the nation-state … In fact, they connect state institutions across this 
distinction, across local and national levels of the state and relate them to a host 
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of different actors, including non-state actors and hybrids, indeterminable 
organizational forms that do not match conventional distinctions between public 
and private. (2005: 230) 
 
What does this attention to the new forms of agency associated with governance add to 
the governance puzzle? I think it brings three critical things into visibility. First, it 
highlights an important question about the forms of knowledge and expertise that are 
valorised in governance (and the forms that are devalued or de-mobilised). Some of 
these valued forms of knowledge derive from the field of what Cutler and Waine (1997) 
call ‘generic management’ – the belief that all organisations share common 
characteristics, and thus can be directed using a set of universal principles, knowledge 
and skills. Secondly, we can see how this may structure who gets to enter into 
governance roles, with preference being given to those who are the bearers of such 
‘relevant knowledge and expertise’: legal and financial knowledge, business experience 
and so on (Ball, 2006; Cowan and McDermont, 2006). Others – such as the bearers of lay 
knowledge, or tacit knowledge of how a service works (from the vantage point of either 
workers or users) – may find themselves marginalised in the ‘business of governance’. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most strikingly, new governance arrangements create the 
conditions in which new knowledges, skills and roles may flourish – ones that emphasise 
cross-boundary working. Transacting, translating, mediating and brokering characterise 
these new ways of working that are central to the forms of governance as partnerships, 
networks and collaborations (Lendvai and Stubbs, 2006; Larner and Craig, 2005;Wedel, 
2001; 2005). Crossing borders, sectors, cultures, and languages forms a critical element 
of how governance is being ‘made up’ in practice. 
 
Returning to the multi-ness of governance, many new forms of governance also have a 
multi-ethnic or multi-cultural character.  In one sense, this reflects the collapse of the 
imagined geographies that linked ‘race and place’ in apparently stable or sedimented 
forms. Such imagined alignments ranged from national to local spaces (where dense 
conceptions of attachment, belonging and ownership are condensed). This can be 
viewed as the general character of European modernity (see, for example, Kooiman’s 
conception of governance as related to the complexity, diversity and dynamics of 
modern societies, 1993).  But it can also be seen as the emergence of governmental 
strategies for governing populations where formations of ethnic/cultural differentiation 
have become intensely poltiicised in transnational, national and local forms (Hesse, 
2001; Lewis, 2000; Modood, 2005; Parekh, 2000), New governance arrangements that 
are structured by this multi-ness aim to accommodate or contain potential social and 
political antagonisms. Multi-ethnic/cultural governance creates zones of containment 
that may also be the site of accommodating differences or producing practices of 
cohabitation or conviviality (Gilroy, 2005). I have deliberately run multi-cultural and 
multi-ethnic together in this discussion, despite the possible differences and 
distinctions. The contemporary flux of differences constructed around national 
identities, ethnic identities and religious/faith affiliations – and the attempts to make 
them align with one another – marks a difficult, shifting and troubling field of conflicted 
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and contested identifications. In the process, histories of how ‘place and race’ are 
connected to senses of attachment and identification, ownership claims, and ideas of 
belonging in ways that create a distinctive field of governance problems. 
 
The ‘multi-ness’ of governance is an integral feature of the rise of governance. It 
requires us to think about how governance arrangements work on and across 
categorical distinctions – between nations, levels, sectors, agencies, cultures and more. 
Governance works across them and reworks them in the processes of governing – 
borders and boundaries are remade, redrawn or rendered more permeable to some 
sorts of flows. Hybrid forms emerge that do not simply ‘belong’ to one side of a 
boundary or another – they work interstitially or liiminally in the ambiguous spaces 
around boundaries. But governance arrangements do not necessarily wholly eradicate 
such distinctions, rather they both blur and sustain them. Nations are a condition for 
multi-national governance (even as national sovereignty is reworked in such processes); 
sectoral distinctions are important for public-private partnerships; multiple ethnicities 
are both contested and reproduced in ‘multi-cultural’ governance.  
 
Making governance popular? 
 
Conventional accounts of the governance story (as the shift from government to 
governance) often identify state failure as a driving force in two different ways. One 
concerns the inadequacies of public agencies (usually coded as ‘bureaucracies’). They 
stand accused of being wasteful or inefficient means of achieving public objectives. A 
whole era of governance innovations have been directed to resolving such state failures 
(the New Public Management, contractualization, marketization , privatization, public-
private partnerships, the expansion of the not for profit sector in service provision and 
so on). But state failure is also associated with the problems of representative politics, in 
particular the rise of scepticism, cynicism, and alienation from the institutional 
processes of politics (registered in declining participation in such indices as party 
membership and voting, see Stoker, 2006). At the same time, there are concerns about 
the volatility and vulnerabilities of democratic processes. ‘Democracy’ is the focus of 
desires and fears, particularly that democratic politics may be ‘captured’ and ‘exploited’ 
by unrepresentative or unreasonable interests (e.g., the rise of sectarian, extreme left or 
right wing parties or restorationist ethno-nationalisms, see Kalb, 2005).  
 
One dynamic of governance innovation is thus the concern to reconnect ‘ordinary 
people’ in ways that overcome or counterbvalance these problems and risks of 
representative politics. Governance is identified as a site of possible encounters in which 
people can be re-engaged; the marginal or voiceless may be included; a more 
representative public may make its views heard; and popular legitimacy may be 
constructed and affirmed. We can see here the two tendencies that make up the ‘crisis 
of representation’ in representative politics (Saward, 2005; 2006). On the one hand, 
declining participation creates a crisis of legitimacy for political representatives – 
manifested in declining trust in elected governments and politicians. This is the 
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institutional crisis of representation: associated with the institutional forms of parties 
and governments. On the other hand, in complex societies political representatives are 
rarely ‘representative’ of the populations that they seek to represent: they tend to be 
male, be from majority racial or ethnic groups, be able-bodied rather than disabled and 
so on.  This is the social crisis of representation. As the socio-demographics of societies 
become an object of contestation – as social position and social identity are understood 
to carry differences of interest – then social representation and representativeness 
become increasingly difficult terrain for the political process: ‘how can they speak for 
us?’
2
 
 
Governance then appears as both a site where the ‘crisis of democracy’ may be 
overcome and a setting for new forms of ‘democratic deficit’. Let us consider this 
paradox of governance a little further. Governance arrangements have often been 
directed to discovering ‘civil society’ and bringing people into the processes of 
governing.  At the same time, other governance innovations have been directed to 
ensuring improved efficiency and effectiveness, for example in the provision of public 
services. These may not foreground ‘participation’, preferring models of governance 
that are ‘streamlined’ and ‘businesslike’. Indeed, in some governance contexts, the 
public may be actively excluded from the business of governance, where business is 
conducted behind the screen of ‘commercial confidentiality’. In such contexts, the 
agents of governance are likely to be the figures representing organisations, rather than 
the public or social groups: the partners, the clients and contractors, and (possibly) the 
regulatory agencies under whose gaze the business is to be conducted. Such 
representatives are expected to ‘do business’, although as Aldred (2007) indicates there 
may be important distinctions between entrepreneurial and managerial discourses of 
being businesslike. Such governance forms have been criticised for their exclusion of 
both public and political representatives – being seen as deepening the ‘democratic 
deficit’ in contemporary societies.  This deficit is also associated with the role played by 
what John Stewart (1995) called ‘ the new magistracy’ – the appointed, rather than 
elected, members of governance processes (see also Skelcher, 1998). This reinvention of 
the ‘great and the good’ and their enrolment into the architecture of governance also 
                                                 
2
  As I was writing this piece, a controversy was taking 
place about who could plausibly claim to represent or speak 
for minority ethnic communities in the UK. The New 
Generation Network challenged established ‘community 
leaders’ as unrepresentative and inappropriate voices. 
Established faith-centred organisations (Hindu, Muslim and 
Sikh) asserted both their substantial social base, and their 
own internal democratic character, to legitimate their right 
to speak. Other commentators (Sivandan, The Guardian, 
30/11/2006) challenged the critics for losing sight of 
racism – and the increasingly racist legislation and 
practices of the British state – as the key political issue. 
See also Loha and Malik, 2006. 
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demonstrates the preference for experience in the ‘real world’ of business and the 
associated ‘can do’ culture (Ball, 2006). 
 
But alongside this ‘efficiency drive’ governance innovations have also sought to re-
engage the citizen, the public and communities in governing (see Barnes et al, 2007). A 
variety of deliberative and participative forms of engaging publics in the process of 
governing have emerged in the last two decades – in the practices of ‘mature 
democracies’ just as much as in ‘emerging’ or ‘developing’ nations (Li, forthcoming). For 
some, such governance arrangements are superior to the imperfections of 
representative politics. They may be more representative (in socio-demographic terms); 
they may be more ‘open’ to multiple interests and voices; they may be more ‘authentic’ 
(engaging ‘ordinary people’ rather than ‘professional politicians’) and they may avoid 
the biases and distortions of parties and political machines. For others, such 
participatory arrangements are characterised by two more troubling dynamics. First, 
public participation tends to produce, as much as it reflects, ‘publics’. Publics are sought 
out, invited, seduced and constituted in the process of participation. Second, public 
participation processes are themselves governed – or, perhaps more accurately 
managed – as part of the work of governing. They have to be staged, peopled, 
performed – and their consequences taken into other parts of the governing apparatus. 
This is not to claim that consultation, deliberation and participation are ‘stage managed’ 
or merely ‘window dressing’, Such processes reflect contexts in which the need to 
engage the public is powerfully felt. They also have consequences for both the 
performance and practice of governing. It is the case, however, that such consequences 
tend to be indeterminate. The fact of consultation may be more important than the 
effect of consultation.
3
 
 
The recent enthusiasm for ‘civil society’ often involves a distinction between 
participation and politics, or between civil society and the state, which treats the former 
terms as more true, authentic or popularly grounded. In contrast, politics or state 
institutions tend to be seen as what Elyachar calls ‘antipeople and anticommunity’ 
(2002: 496). Civil society, then, appears as a fertile ground for renewing social and 
political engagement – not least because it is where people, not politics, are located. 
This popular conception of civil society may also be a populist one, celebrating popular 
voices against elites and power blocs. In the process, we may be encountering demotic, 
rather than democratic, modes of governing – in which speaking in the name (and 
sometimes voice) of ‘ordinary people’ becomes a political mode in itself (see, for 
example, Andrews, 2006 on ‘postmodern populism’ in Italian politics; and Frank, 2001, 
                                                 
3
  This ‘performative’ character is not peculiar to 
participatory or consultative governance arrangements. All 
governance processes have dimensions of performance to them 
in which both the organisations and individual agents within 
them are expected to ‘play their parts’: performing ‘being 
businesslike’, ‘doing listening’, ‘speaking for local 
people’, or just ‘being reasonable’. 
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on ‘market populism’). Various communication technologies are bound up with these 
developments: popular media that claim to be vigorous defenders of the ‘public 
interest’ and address their audiences in vernacular and demotic styles; and the rise of 
‘polling and voting’ as technologies of popular media, in both factual and entertainment 
modes (‘You, the jury’…). One distinctive element is the growth of on-line opinion 
sampling and polling, promising more ‘immediate’ (in both temporal and socially 
transparent senses) access to popular/public opinion. Such popular ‘voicings’ might be 
seen as demotic, rather than democratic, being generally under-determined by 
systematic conceptions of represemtation (Clarke et al, 2007). 
 
Here we can see how the crisis of representation returns to haunt other forms of 
representation. On-line surveys are structured by the underlying distribution of digital 
access (and the possible social and political predispositions that might be associated 
with such inequalities). In different ways, generalising claims about ‘the public’ or 
’ordinary people’ tend to conceal or occlude distinctions and divisions that may be 
effective. On the other hand, the pursuit of socio-demographic specificity, often with 
the purpose of engaging the marginal, excluded or ‘hard to reach’ demographic 
segments may risk attributing a unified set of attributes to groups that are internally 
heterogeneous (women; disabled people; the young; the old; users of services; 
residents of a locality; minority ethnic groups and so on).  
 
Critics of the civil society and NGO-centred modes of governance have raised a number 
of problems, two of which are particularly relevant here. One is that NGOs and related 
organisations evoke the same political ambivalence as states used to: they are both 
‘representative’ of the people and act as a power over them, governing resources, 
allocating opportunities and establishing conditions of conduct. Of course, different 
NGOs occupy this field of multiple possibilities in particular ways (just as states vary), 
but there can be no simple presumption of the more authentic or organic character of 
the NGO form as a vehicle or site of governance (see, for example, Gardner and Lewis, 
1997; Fisher, 1997). Secondly, NGOs, for some of the reasons set out above, are part of 
what James Ferguson (1990) called the ‘antipolitics machine’ of development – the 
processes and mechanisms that displace and disguise the conflicted political character 
of development policy and practice. Making things ‘technical’, and subject to regulation 
through different sorts of expertise, avoids and evades political conflict. Such neutral 
expertise may include the lay knowledge of ‘ordinary people’, as well as 
technical/professional experts, because ordinary people are not ‘political’ (see Elyachar, 
2002). 
 
This second governance puzzle centres on politics – or, more accurately, on the 
intersection of different aspects and meanings of politics around the forms and 
practices of governance. Governance stands in an angular relationship to formal or 
representative political processes – promising to remedy state failure and the crisis of 
political legitimacy, in part by creating new sites of popular engagement and 
participation. Governance may expand the reach of political involvement by targeting 
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marginalised or excluded groups, or by engaging ‘civil society’ groups and organisations. 
In such processes, governance may also revive the political problems of representation – 
who is allowed and invited to speak for ‘ordinary people’ of different kinds. But 
governance may also involve the drive to ‘de-politicise’ conflicted or potentially 
conflictual issues – by turning them into the concern of ‘ordinary people’ and 
‘communities’ who are constructed as ‘outside politics’, or by making them the focus of 
technical knowledge, forms of expertise that are ‘above politics’. We might finally note 
that the design of governance systems, process and organisations might itself be 
thought of as ‘political’. Deciding what sorts of arrangements govern what issues; who is 
invited to take their place within governance arrangements; what sorts of 
representation and knowledge are valued; and the horizons of what any governance 
body may govern are themselves political choices (see, for example, Jessop, 2000, on 
‘meta-governance’ and states). The rise and proliferation of governance arrangements – 
as well as the specific character of particular governance processes – can be viewed as 
political processes, rather than just a generic social trend. 
 
 ‘There must be some way out of here’? Egovernance and governance puzzles. 
 
These two governance puzzles – the multi-ness of governance and making governance 
popular – contribute to a view of governance as a field of emergent and unfinished 
practices. These properties are visible at different levels of analysis in studying 
governance. They are characteristics of what might be called ‘governance systems’ – the 
assemblages of apparatuses, agencies, policies and practices that claim to govern 
particular spaces, objects or social domains. However, their profoundly unsystematic 
quality makes ‘system’ a somewhat risky term to use. They might be better described as 
formations, constellations or assemblages in order to emphasise their multiple elements 
and the contingent relationships that hold them together for periods of time. Such 
terms foregound the combination of instability and innovation that seems typical of 
governance arrangements.  
 
The same properties can also be observed at the level of individual governance 
organisations. In part, this reflects the way in which specific governance forms are 
themselves hybrids or assemblages, bringing different agents into new configurations. 
But these properties are combined in complicated ways with patterns of 
institutionalisation, in which particular assemblages crystallise and take on the 
appearance of solidity and permanence.  New organisational forms, valued patterns of 
knowledge and expertise, and condensations of power and authority become solidified 
or sedimented. They become ‘governance’ – its arrangements, its architecture, its 
processes and its practices. 
 
So, what are the relationships between this difficult dynamic of flux and solidification 
and the rise of egovernance? In this final section I explore three views of this 
intersection. The first treats egovernance as the inheritor of governance logics (or as the 
solution to their problems). The second sees egovernance as a further paradigm shift in 
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the government to governance narrative. The third concentrates on the ways in which 
egovernance might reconfigure the management of dispersed and multiple sites of 
power in the processes of governing. 
 
For governments in particular, digital technologies seem to represent an enhanced 
technical capacity for the extension of current governance logics. New technologies are 
seen to ‘go with the flow’ of current trends in several ways. They provide governmental 
organisations with significant increases in information management capacities, in terms 
of the accumulation and use of data in relation to areas that have been, or emerging as, 
the core business of government (for example, revenue collection; policing – in both 
domestic and border settings - and aspects of social welfare, particularly fiscal welfare). 
Secondly, the enhanced ‘connectivity’ provided by digital systems can enable the ‘multi-
ness’ of dispersed governance, making the transnational, translocal, cross-sector, cross-
agency relationships of governance easier to conduct. Thirdly, digital technologies are 
understood as enabling, and even empowering, the citizen in their interactions with 
government and other governance agencies. ICTs can make governance popular through 
providing a dynamic interface between individuals and the state (and its proxies). It 
provides the immediate means of access to government, a means of addressing 
enquiries to citizens, and the means of engaging selected or targeted groups: new 
technologies have a ‘democratising’ capacity. Finally, digital technologies offer the 
promise of enabling the ‘personalisation’ of public services – the grater tailoring of 
provision to the individual needs, circumstances and wants of the individual. Such 
personalisation is a core theme in current public service reform (see, for example, 
Department of Health, 2006 and Leadbetter, 2004) and new technologies represent a 
critical resource for making the rhetorical move from ‘one size fits all’ to ‘tailor made’ 
services. 
 
Such conceptions of the ‘fit’ between contemporary governance logics and new digital 
technologies both over-estimate and underestimate the ‘technical’ character of these 
technologies. They also offer a disconcertingly coherent account of governance logics. 
Over-estimating the technical character of ICTs involves a typically de-socialising and de-
politicising sense of the ‘technical’: thus ICTs are treated as neutral means for achieving 
already established governance principles and models. As a ‘technical fix’, new 
technologies mean that governments can achieve their objectives – whether these be 
greater efficiency, greater public engagement, the personalisation or diversification of 
services, or simply the elaboration of more ‘modern’ systems of governance. Digital 
technologies permit and enable all of these.  
 
But this ‘technical fix’ view of egovernance also underestimates the technical character 
of digital technologies in the sense of underestimating the organisational, social and 
political consequences that such technologies may create. A stronger view of ICTs as 
‘socio-technical systems’ suggests that new technologies may further some existing 
governance tendencies, but undermine or displace others (Dunleavy et al, 2006). Such a 
socio-technical view might also require attention to how digital technologies might 
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reconfigure forms and architectures of power in and around governance. This leads to 
the second view of egovernance and governance puzzles. In a recent substantial study, 
Dunleavy et al (2006) have argued that digital technologies have the capacity to create a 
new governance paradigm: Digital Era Governance (DEG). 
 
Their view links the rise of e-government to the waning influence of the New Public 
Management as the previous dominant governance paradigm. They suggest that the 
NPM both ran out of steam and produced perverse effects and governance failures, 
creating a set of conditions in which governance paradigm changes have become 
possible. While avoiding technological determinism, they suggest that the congruence 
of digital technologies and governance opportunities and problems forms a distinct 
opportunity for a new paradigm: 
 
[G]overnment IT changes are no longer peripheral or routine aspects of 
contemporary public management and public policy changes, but increasingly 
important and determinant influences upon what is feasible. IT and information 
system influences are as salient in current public sector management as they are 
fundamental in contemporary Weberian rationalization processes. We see this 
influence of It systems as having effects not in any directly technologically 
determined way but via a wide range of cognitive, behavioural, organizational, 
political, and cultural changes that are linked to information systems broadly 
construed … DEG processes could achieve productivity and effectiveness 
improvements while simultaneously simplifying the state apparatus and 
expanding citizen control of their own affairs. The opportunity to secure such a 
‘golden mix’ of objectives does not occur often in public management. (2006: 217) 
 
Although it is not possible to examine their argument in detail here, Dunleavy and his 
colleagues claim that DEG involves three clusters of changes. The first, reintegration, 
indicates that digital systems can overcome the fragmentation of government 
associated with the New Public Management by providing the system basis for drawing 
functions back into the state. This is likely to be efficient in its own terms, and promises 
to overcome the inefficiencies and duplications resulting from NPM driven process of 
dispersal and proliferation. The second cluster of changes, needs based holism, involves 
reforms that ‘seek to simplify and change the entire relationship between agencies and 
their clients … It also stress developing a more ‘agile’ government that can respond 
speedily and flexibly to changes in the social environment’ (2006: 227). The third cluster, 
digitization changes, involves IT processes and channels moving from secondary or 
supplementary roles to being the dominant, normal and potentially only mode of doing 
administration and business (2006: 228). They argue that these technological, or socio-
technical developments, go ‘with the grain’ of current trends in governance, and state-
citizen relationships: 
 
Despite this inevitable indeterminacy, we believe that the current period holds out 
the promise of a potential transition to amore genuinely integrated and citizen-
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orientated government, whose organizational operations are visible in detail both 
to the personnel operating in the fewer, broader public agencies and to citizen 
and civil society organizations. (2006: 248) 
 
In exploring the conditions of social and political indeterminacy for this possibility, the 
authors construct a set of scenarios in which it may be achieved, diminished or 
deflected. Although avoiding the problems of technological determinism is indeed 
important, for me this analysis suffers from different problems that result from an 
overly coherent and too narrow view of governance itself.  While the NPM was 
important as a model for fragmenting states, especially in the domain of public services, 
not all of the governance reforms were driven by its centripetal logic. Some changes 
involved the centralization of some forms of power and authority, while others stressed 
engagement, participation and partnership as we have seen. Still others created ‘plural 
provision’ structured by dynamics of competition and choice around services that might 
prove difficult to re-integrate. The UK has built an elaborate system of planning, finding 
and evaluating such processes that frames individual organisations in a 
comparative/competitive logic (Clarke, 2004, chapter 7). Indeed, the whole field of 
governance changes looks considerably more heterogeneous than the New Public 
Management model, even if managerialism provided a distinctive connective discourse 
(Clarke and Newman, 1997; Newman, 2005). For me, this suggests that digital era 
governance might be subject to more, and more contradictory, forces and trends than 
Dunleavy and his co-authors allow for (Clarke, 2006). 
 
There are three tendencies that have the potential to disrupt the optimistic reading of 
Digital Era Governance. They are tendencies that involve the articulation of forms of 
power, authority and knowledge in governance processes. Let me begin with the 
persistently troubled relationships between states and citizens (Clarke, 2005). Dunleavy 
and his colleagues read this relationship as primarily concerned with the dynamics of 
empowering and enabling more autonomous citizens. Bleaker views would point to the 
tendency of states to accumulate knowledge of, and power over, citizens as a dynamic 
of ‘securitization’ of societies (e.g., Huysmans, 2006) or the spread of a culture of 
control (Garland, 2001). The capacity for the reintegration, or further centralization, of 
knowledge and power through digital technologies expands the possibilities for state 
control over citizens, rather than their autonomization. 
 
A more sceptical view of autonomised citizens is offered by other perspectives, 
particularly post-Foucauldian studies of governmentalities, which treat autonomisation 
as a conditional and managed process of ‘governing at a distance’ (Cruikshank, 1999; 
Rose, 1999). In this view citizens are being made ‘responsible’ in specific ways (for their 
financial welfare, health, work-life balance, security and so on). Such responsibilization 
does, of course, create ‘autonomy’, but it adds other dynamics too. It makes rights more 
conditional on the performance of responsibilities, creates new frames for of judging 
success and failure, and constructs new governance processes to scrutinize and evaluate 
JC: governance 15 3/9/09 
the performance of responsibility (see Bauman, 1998, for a particularly bleak view of 
these changes). 
 
The second governance dynamic concerns the forms of knowledge/power knots that are 
condensed in governance arrangements and how these might engage with the 
potentials of DEG. Some of the innovative, hybrid forms of governance arrangement are 
not simply the effect of NPM fragmentation. The dispersal of the state and its powers 
was driven by other desires – to subordinate bureau-professional power in public 
services to better means of discipline (market and/or managerial authority); to remake 
the relationship between government and corporate capital (in partnerships and 
contracting relationships); and to engage voluntary, third sector or civil society 
organisations in a more plural (and cheaper) provision of public services (Clarke and 
Newman, 1997). What Jessop and other have called a ‘politics of scale’ points to 
contested dimensions, as well as relations, of governance arrangements (Brenner, 2004; 
Jessop, 2002).  There is no simple rationality for re-integration – rather we encounter a 
whole series of political, governmental, economic and managerial calculations about the 
advantages of particular scales, sizes and forms of governing. While Dunleavy and his 
colleagues make a central feature of the ‘contracted out’ character of IT development 
and provision in government, they seem less attentive to the contracted out character 
of other aspects of the state (and the potential costs of unlocking long term contracting 
to enable reintegration). I do not mean to concentrate exclusively on narrow economic 
calculations around governance (important though they are), but it may be important to 
think of existing governance arrangements as the site of sunk investments of various 
kinds (the base for community organization, the location of distinctive forms of 
knowledge and power; the place of new skills and careers; the organisational form taken 
by the ‘local’ and so on). To these might be added Jessop’s ‘meta-governance’ 
calculations – of governmental, political and partisan advantage to be gained from 
governance arrangements. These may well incline towards reinforcing the potentials 
identified by Dunleavy and colleagues but they are calculations that may be framed by 
temporalities other than the long-term rationalization of government. 
 
In the end, I am persuaded by the insistence on treating digital technologies as ‘socio-
technical systems’, rather than technical fixes, but I think that analysing these socio-
technical systems needs to be informed by a richer understanding of the social in 
relation to governance. Reducing governance to two simplifying paradigms misses the 
heterogeneous character of governance arrangements.  In contrast, Governance puzzles 
– about the multi-ness of governance and the ambivalences involved in making 
governance popular – provide ways of thinking about how this heterogeneity is the 
product of the contested and unfinished dynamics of governance. 
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